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Generational Accounts (GAs) measure the fiscal sustainability of the public sector. We ask 
whether the contributions from the Government Pension Fund and remaining oil and gas 
wealth in the ground, together with the pension reform taking effect in 2011, are sufficiently 
large to secure generational balance in Norway. Our results show that the pension reform 
has a substantial effect, and contributes as much to generational balance as the total 
petroleum wealth. Neither increased economic growth per se nor increased fertility 
contribute to improve the GAs. The structural characteristics of higher employment and 
lower transfer payments typical for cyclical upturns, improve the GAs substantially. 
Optimistic assumptions regarding these structural characteristics do not remove the need 
for further reforms to obtain fiscal sustainability of the Norwegian public sector. 
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In an almost twenty year old study, Auerbach et al. (1993) asked the question: “Norway: Is 
the nation over-consuming its petroleum wealth?” They analyzed this question with the 
method of Generational Accounting and their answer was: yes, Norway did over-consume. 
This result was partly confirmed in a later study by Steigum (1996). In this paper we first 
examine whether the Auerbach-conclusion still holds. There are indications that it does. 
Foremost, Norway has experienced a significant rise in life expectancy at birth from 77.3 to 
80.7 years. In addition, the share of the younger part of the population that are not working 
has increased. However, net migration has increased over the period. Many of the 
immigrants are relatively young and well educated, alleviating long-term fiscal challenges. 
Furthermore, since 2000 oil prices have risen sharply, and the petroleum wealth has 
increased accordingly.  
Instead of consuming the petroleum wealth right away, the Norwegian Parliament 
has chosen a fiscal rule to inject the Petroleum wealth into the economy along a moderate 
path. It has been a stated policy objective to pursue moderation in the sense that the 
petroleum wealth should be perpetuated to benefit all future generations. The newly 
enacted pension reform is a major political effort to bolster such a policy of 
intergenerational distribution of the petroleum wealth. The second purpose of this paper is 
to inquire whether this reform secures such an aim.  
The pension reform is to take effect from 2011. It seeks to neutralize the 
expenditure effect due to population ageing in general, and to the recent increased growth 
in life expectancy. The reform strengthens ties between former earnings, retirement 
decisions, and pension benefits, thus providing work incentives particularly for elderly 
workers. 
As in the Auerbach et al. (1993) paper, our evaluation tool is Generational 
Accounting. This method was introduced during the early nineties to estimate both explicit 
and implicit public debt in the long run. In Section 2 we describe the method of 
Generational Accounting and the calculation of the sustainability indicators used. The 
sources of data used for these calculations are reported in Section 3. Generational 
Accounting needs three kinds of data; a population projection, age- and sex-specific 
profiles and a general government budget of a certain base-year. Furthermore, we discuss 
in Section 3 our choice for global parameters (growth and discount rates) and the influence 
of the public oil-revenues on the general budget. In Section 4 we provide the results of the 
  1Generational Accounting analyses using different kinds of sustainability indicators. 
Furthermore, we illustrate the findings of the sensitivity analyses, wherein we analyze the 
effects of different population scenarios and the choice of several parameters. In Section 5 
the current Pension Reform is analyzed, and Section 6 concludes. 
2.   The Methodology of Generational Accounting 
To measure the sustainability of a country’s public sector we use the method of 
Generational Accounting developed by Auerbach, Gokhale and Kotlikoff (1991, 1992 and 
1994). In contrast to traditional budget indicators which are based on annual cash flow 
budgets, Generational Accounting is founded on the intertemporal budget constraint and 
therefore the long-term implications of a current policy can be computed.
1 The 
intertemporal budget constraint of the public sector, expressed in present value terms of a 
base-year b is: 
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D denotes agents’ maximum age and   the present value of year b’s net tax 
payments, i.e., taxes paid net of transfers received, made by all members of a generation 
born in year   over the remaining lifecycle. Then, the first right-hand term of equation (1) 
represents the aggregate net taxes of all generations alive in the base-year b. The second 
term aggregates the net tax payments made by future generations born in year 
, bk N
k
1 b+  or 
later. Together this is equal to the left-hand side of equation (1),  , which stands for the 
net debt in year b. That means if the sum of all living generations’ net taxes,  , is 
negative (i.e. if they receive a net transfer) and the net debt,  , positive, the sum of future 
generations’ net taxes has to be positive to balance the government’s intertemporal budget 
i.e. in a long-term perspective net transfers received by living generations plus the net debt 








                                                 
1 The further description of the methodology of Generational Accounting is mainly based on Raffelhüschen 
(1999) and Bonin (2001). For an analytical derivation of the intertemporal budget constraint see Benz and 
Fetzer (2006) or Fetzer (2006). Hagist (2008) gives an overview about the empirical studies with 
generational accounting along with a discussion concerning critical points in theoretical as well as empirical 
terms. 
  2To calculate generations’ aggregated lifecycle net tax payments, the net payment 
terms in equation (1) are decomposed into: 















In equation (2),  denotes the average net tax paid in year   by a representative 
member of the generation born in year  , whereas   stands for the number of members 
of a generation born in year   who survives until year  . To compute the remaining 
lifetime net payments of living generations, the future demographic structure is specified 
conducting long-term population forecasts.  
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Typically,  Generational Accountants disaggregate equation (2) even further. To 
incorporate gender-specific differences in average tax payments and transfer receipts by 
age, separate aggregation of the average net taxes paid by male and female cohort 
members is required. The products aggregated in equation (2) represent the net taxes 
paid by all members of generation k  in year  . For generations born prior to the base-year 
the summation starts from year b, while for future born cohorts, the summation starts in 
year  . Irrespective of the year of birth, all payments are discounted back to the base-




The age-specific net tax payment in year   of agents born in year    can be 
decomposed as 
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i k s h , ,  stands for the average tax or transfer of type i paid or received in year   by 
agents born in year  , thus of age 
s
k sk − .
2 In equation (3),   indicates a tax payment, 
whereas   defines a transfer. 
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Applying the method of Generational Accounting it is conventionally assumed that 
initial fiscal policy and economic behavior are constant over time. Under this condition it is 
possible to project future average tax payments and transfer receipts per capita from the 
base-year age profile of payments according to 
                                                 
2 In case of an isolated analysis of public subsystems like health care or public pension as conducted in the 
following chapters, i is just chosen so that all relevant payment streams are included in the analysis. 
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where g represents the annual rate of productivity growth. Equation (4) assigns to each 
agent of age s-k in year s the tax and transfer payment observed for agents of the same 
age in base-year b, uprated for gains in productivity. The base-year cross section of age-
specific tax and transfer payments per capita is generally determined in two steps. First, 
the relative position of age cohorts between themselves in the tax and transfer system is 
estimated from micro-data profiles. In a second step the relative age profiles are re-
evaluated proportionally to fit the expenditure and tax revenues of the base-year. 
For living and future generations, division of the aggregate remaining lifetime net tax 
payments by the number of cohort members alive in year s defines the cohort’s 
Generational Account in year s: 











Generational Accounts are constructed in a purely forward-looking manner, only the 
taxes paid and the transfers received in or after the base-year are considered. As a 
consequence,  Generational Accounts cannot be compared across living generations 
because they incorporate effects of differential lifetime. One may compare, however, the 
Generational Accounts of base-year and future born agents, who are observed over their 
entire lifecycle. 
To illustrate the fiscal burden of current fiscal policy we use seven sustainability 
indicators:
3 The starting point for the first indicators are the intertemporal public liabilities 
which can be computed by the assumption that the intertemporal budget constraint of the 
public sector (1) is violated: 
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The amount of intertemporal public liabilities measures aggregate unfunded claims 
on future budgets, assuming that the present policy will hold for the future. The first 
sustainability indicator, the fiscal gap ( ), can be derived if the intertemporal public  b FG
                                                 
3 For a discussion of measuring fiscal sustainability and the development of sustainability indicators, see 
Raffelhüschen (1999) and Benz and Fetzer (2006). 
  4liabilities are set in relation to base-year’s GDP ( ). This indicator is akin to the debt 
quota well known since the Maastricht treaty but it addresses the total debt, i.e. the debt 
which will occur in the future added to the debt inherited from the past: 
b GDP








How the policy adjustment required to redeem intertemporal public liabilities will 
affect generations’ fiscal burdens is uncertain. For illustrative purposes, Generational 
Accounting typically assigns the entire adjustment to future generations which is 
equivalent to k > b. All tax payments made by members of future born cohorts are 
adjusted proportionally with the help of a uniform scaling factor θ . The factor θ  is set to 
ensure balance of the intertemporal public budget defined in equation (1): 
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for and instead of equation (4). Computing the average age-specific net taxes paid by 
representative future born agents, the burden for future generations can be illustrated as 
an absolute difference between the Generational Account of the base-year agent and the 
Generational Account of the one year after base-year born agent. This is our second 
sustainability indicator, the future generations’ burden: 
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The third indicator that illustrates the burden of current fiscal policy is the revenue 
gap. In this case the scaling factor  rev θ θ =  reflects the enhancement of age-specific 
revenues in per cent for all generations which is necessary to close the intertemporal 
public budget constraint. It can also be interpreted as the ratio of the intertemporal public 
liabilities to the present value of all age-specific revenues of the fiscal system : 



















with  Re s v  referring to the sum of revenues in year   by all living generations in year  . 
Analogous to the revenue gap, we compute also the so-called transfer gap. In this case 
s s
  5the scaling factor  trf θ θ =  reflects the necessary decrement of age-specific public 
transfers (Trf) like health benefits in per cent for all generations that is necessary to close 
the intertemporal public budget constraint. Constructing the revenue and transfer gap, we 
implicitly assume that the government is able to enforce an immediate adjustment of all 
taxes and contributions or transfers respectively.  
All used indicators are defined using an infinite time horizon. In the practical 
calculation all relevant variables like population or cohorts’ tax payments are projected for 
300 years from the base-year on. Afterwards a geometrical serial is used to determine the 
remaining net tax payments. The choice of 300 periods is nearly completely arbitrary and 
just reflects a good approximation point for our analysis. 
3.   Data and Assumptions 
To compute Generational Accounts and to calculate the described indicators, a population 
projection is needed. Furthermore the calculations require the expenditures and revenues 
of the Norwegian public sector in 2009, age-sex-profiles for the different expenditure and 
revenue types and a growth rate of the productivity as well as a discount rate. The 
population projection in the following is calculated with a demographic program developed 
by Bonin (2001). 
3.1 Population  Projection 
Generational Accounting requires detailed population projections, which distinguish 
between three possible scenarios titled medium variant,  high variant and low variant. 
Based on different assumptions about the three parameters life expectancy, fertility and 
migration it is possible to derive a population projection for each of the demographic 
scenarios. Own calculations are necessary for the reason of Generational Accounting’s 
assumed infinite time horizon: The official projections end in 2060 while we need a 300 
years projection period. In these calculations we use for the parameters of the year 2009 
the given data of Statistics Norway. The projected parameters until year 2060 in the 
different scenarios originate from the assumptions made by Statistics Norway (2010a). 
Table 1 shows those central assumptions of the three scenarios. 
  6Table 1: Central Assumptions of Norwegian Population Projections 
Parameter  Year 
Scenario 
Medium Variant  High Variant  Low Variant 
Total Fertility Rate 
2009  1.98 1.98  1.98 
2060  1.95 2.1  1.7 
Life Expectancy at birth 
for females/males in 
years 
2009  83.1/78.6  83.1/78.6  83.1/78.6 
2060  90.3/87.1  93.4/90.2  87.1/84.0 
Net migration 
2009  38,637 38,637  38,637 
2060  22,000 31,000  14,000 
Source: Statistics Norway (2010a) 
In the following the future size and structure of the Norwegian population can be 
anticipated for all three different demographic scenarios. The outcomes of these 
projections are shown in Figure 1. Compared to the official calculations of Statistics 
Norway (2010a), we (nearly) exactly hit the Norwegian population in 2050 within our 
medium projection. 
From Figure 1 we see that in the medium variant of the Norwegian population 
projection the population grows over the projection horizon. After this scenario the 
population increases from 4.7 million in 2007 to 7.7 million in 2100. The high variant 
causes a constant increase in terms of population. The population rises to 6.7 million in 
2050 and 9.5 million in 2100. Only the low variant contains a decrease of the population. 
Until it reaches the year 2036, the population grows also in this scenario due to the 
increasing life expectancy of both men and women, afterwards a shrinkage process begins 
which causes a population of 5 million in 2050 and 3.9 million in 2100. For the following 
analysis we take the medium variant as our standard scenario if not stated differently. 
Outcomes for the two other scenarios can be found in Section 4.3 of this paper. 
  7Figure 1: Different developments of the Norwegian population until 2100 
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Figure 2 presents the population projection based on the medium variant in the 
years 2009, 2025, 2050 and 2100 divided by age and sex. In the base-year the Norwegian 
population shows a few remarkable patterns. The first anomaly in the development of the 
Norwegian population occurred for the cohorts of the 86-year-olds until the 72-year-olds in 
2009. This is caused by the Second World War. However, the impact of the war for the 
population structure in Norway is much lower than in most other middle-European nations. 
The “baby-boom” gave birth-rates of almost three children per woman. At the end of the 
1960s the so-called “pill kink” finished this boom with sharply lower fertility rates. Due to 
increasing fertility rates after 1985 there is growth in the cohorts of 24-year-olds and 
younger. The reasons for this increase are difficult to pin down, because it did not happen 
in most other middle-European countries. However, the generous family benefits together 
with a sound economic development may be one cause (Rønsen (2004)). 
  8Figure 2: Norwegian population in 2009, 2025, 2050 and 2100 
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Figure 2 shows an increase in the absolute size of the Norwegian population in the 
future. Especially the cohorts above the age of 60 years are expected to grow constantly, 
while the size of the younger cohorts will be more stable. This is mainly caused by the 
augmentation of the life expectancy in Norway combined with fertility rates near 
reproduction levels. 
Figure 3 shows the development of the old-age-dependency-ratio (67+), defined as 
the ratio between members of cohorts older than 66 years to the sum of all generations 
between 20 and 66 years. This ratio measures how future changes in the population 
structure affects the relative size of cohorts, i.e. this ratio shows the proportion between 
the old part of the society and the younger working part. The development of the old-age-
dependency-ratio gives a first hint of potential social security imbalances in the future. 
  9Figure 3: Development of the old-age-dependency-ratio until 2100 in Norway 
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3.2  Public Sector Finances and Petroleum Revenues 
The budget of the Norwegian general government, which is shown in Table 2 based on 
Statistics Norway (2010b) is characterized by a few remarkable patterns. The aggregates 
for revenues and expenditures which are discussed in the following are taken from 
Statistics Norway (2010b). Revenues include taxes on labor and capital incomes, value 
added tax, property tax and social insurance contributions. The largest part on the 
revenue-side of the Norwegian budget is given by the earnings out of the oil resources of 
the country. The public expenditures contain expenses for general public services, 
defense, public order and safety, economic affairs, and environmental protection, housing 
and cultural activities which are aggregated in the budget item “Governmental 
Consumption”. The aggregate health expenditures on the one hand is divided into four 
different subcategories according to Statistics Norway (2010c). The entry disability and 
sickness (in the original budget of Statistics Norway (2010b)) on the other hand is divided 
into again four subcategories after Ministry of Finance (2008) such as disability pensions, 
sickness benefits, vocational training and the early retirement scheme AFP. 
  10Table 2: Public expenditures and revenues of the Norwegian General Government in 2009 
Public Expenditure (Billion NOK)  Public Revenues (Billion NOK) 
Government Consumption  297.7  Non-Oil Property Income  101.7 
Oil related expenditures  16.2  Dividend GPF  74.9 
Interest Payments  34.0  Property Income from Oil  98.3 
Outpatient Medical Care  40.7  VAT  187.0 
Inpatient Medical Care  64.4 Customs  duties  2.4 
Pharmaceuticals  22.6  Indirect Taxes on Oil  3.7 
Health Administration  5.3  Alcohol Tax  11.3 
Long-Term-Care  49.4  Tobacco Tax  8.1 
Primary Education  59.7  Gas and Pollution Tax  53.9 
Secondary Education  29.6  Real estate tax  6.5 
Tertiary Education  36.3  Other indirect taxes  12.3 
General Education Expenditures  16.7  Social Security Contributions  234.6 
Old Age Pension  131.6  Income Tax without petrol  305.3 
Survivor Benefits  6.1  Income Tax on petrol activities  149.0 
Early Retirement Scheme (AFP)  12.7  Motorvehicle Tax  6.9 
Disability Benefits  92.3  Other income  75.7 
Sickness Benefits  23.97     
Vocational Training  30.2     
Family Benefits  84.9     
Unemployment Benefits  10.8     
Housing 2.7     
Social Welfare  31.1     
Total Expenditures  1098.6    
Surplus  232.9     
SUM 1331.5  SUM  1331.5 
Source: Own calculations based on Statistics Norway (2010b,c) 
Public coffers in Norway are remarkable compared to other OECD countries. In 
2009 Norway was blessed with a primary surplus of 232.9 billion NOK, nearly a fourth of 
what the public sector spends. Four budget items should be highlighted concerning this 
number. Norway pays 34.0 billion NOK on interest for its public debt of 59.2% of GDP in 
2009 while receiving 74.9 billion NOK in interest and dividends from the Government 
Pension Fund (GPF). These figures show that the Norwegian governmental sector has a 
booking net wealth. Furthermore, oil revenues either from taxes or dividends contributed a 
total of 251.0 billion NOK. However, petroleum revenues will not be sustainable in the 
future. According to official prognoses of the OECD (2007) revenues will shrink to 0.4% of 
their 2005 level until 2060, taking into account price as well as output effects. Figure 4 
  11shows the assumed development of oil revenues in relation to GDP 2005 which will be 
used in the forthcoming calculations. 
Figure 4: Development of Norway’s petroleum revenues 
 


























3.3 Micro  profiles 
Beyond the population projection and the base-year budget of the public sector, age- and 
sex-specific micro-profiles are necessary to define the intertemporal budget constraint of 
the public sector. These profiles are needed to distribute the different aggregates of public 
revenues and expenditures on the cohorts which live in the base-year and hence to 
determine the future public revenues and expenditures. Clearly, these are dependent on 
the demographic development. Entries like government consumption which are not paid or 
consumed in an age-specific way are distributed with a flat per capita profile. The used 
age-and sex-specific profiles stem primarily from Statistics Norway.
4 Health expenditures 
profiles for in-and outpatient treatments, pharmaceuticals and long-term care are taken 
from Fetzer et al. (2005). All profiles together with an overview about how the different 
budget items are distributed are presented in the appendix. 
3.4  Interest and Growth Assumptions 
Because of the infinite time-horizon it is not straightforward to define the constant interest 
and growth rate, which are needed to predict the future revenues and expenditures of the 
                                                 
4 These profiles were given to us by request. 
  12public sector and to analyze the sustainability of this system. Norway’s government 
assumes for its calculation of the present value of the GPF a standardized growth rate (g) 
of 1.5% and a discount rate (r) of 3.0% which we apply in our standard scenario with one 
exception, i.e. oil revenues (see above). 
4.   The sustainability of Norway’s fiscal system 
As described above, the Norwegian state is in the comfortable situation to have an explicit 
budget surplus at present. But this is mainly caused by the high oil revenues of the public 
sector and it is unrealistic to assume that this will be constant in the future. Furthermore, 
an expanding number of retirees is expected. These are entitled to benefits in the public 
pension system and they will receive a major part of the public health care transfers. 
Public pensions as well as public health care transfers are therefore expected to increase. 
The financial consequences of the described revenue-effect and the ageing-effect can be 
calculated by the method of Generational Accounting. The results of these calculations are 
shown in the following. 
4.1 Generational  Accounts 
Figure 5 presents the Generational Accounts of Norwegians by gender in our base year, 
2009, according to our standard scenario (medium variant, g=1.5%, r=3%). The sinus-
shaped pattern is very common in OECD countries with strong pay-as-you-go systems. 
The young between 16 and 33 years finance the elderly generations from 34 years and 
older. Generational Accounts on average begin with minus 1,318,920 NOK for the present 
newborn and are at a maximum of 538,389 NOK paid by the representative 22 years old. 
This means that a 22 years old Norwegian (nearly half male/female) pays 538,389 NOK 
more in taxes and contributions over his/her remaining life-cycle than he/she will receive in 
transfers and subsidies from the Norwegian general government. This includes assigned 
oil revenues which are distributed evenly by (living) capita each year. The generation of 34 
years is the first one which receives more than he/she pays in taxes over his/her remaining 
life-cycle. However, one should keep in mind that Generational Accounting is strict forward 
looking so living generations’ accounts are not comparable. The major receiver is the 
generation of 65 years olds because after 65 years discounting lowers the Generational 
Accounts significantly. This pattern can generally be observed in many developed 
countries. 
  13Figure 5: Generational Accounts of Norway 2009 
 



























In one respect the Norwegian case is special. In spite of high female labor market 
participation rates in Norway, the Generational Accounts between men and women differ 
quite substantially in quantitative as well as qualitative terms until the age of 50 years. The 
calculations indicate that Norwegian men carry the fiscal burden of Norway’s welfare state. 
Surely, this outcome depends on our chosen micro-profiles but also on the higher life 
expectancy of women and their lower income on average.
5 
4.2  The Fiscal Gap and other sustainability indicators 
Our first sustainability indicator is the fiscal gap as defined in equation (7). It measures the 
sum of the Generational Accounts for living and future generations weighted with their 
(expected) cohort size, set in relation to base-year’s GDP. As shown in Table 3 the value 
of the fiscal gap for the whole Norwegian public sector in our standard scenario (medium 
variant, g=1.5%, r=3.0%) is 694%.
6 This means that the Norwegian fiscal policies are not 
sustainable. The Norwegian fiscal gap can be derived as follows: The implicit debt of 
Norwegian fiscal policy (taxes not related to oil, social security contributions, expenditures 
for health and public pension, etc.) is 850% of GDP. Adding the explicit public debt with 
                                                 
5  For example women receive the major share of family benefits while one could also assume that the 
incidence is really based on the child or the family (husband, wife, children) as a whole. Please consult 
Section 4.3.3 for a sensitivity analysis. 
6  In the literature, the fiscal gap is normally positive if a government is in debt i.e. if the demographic 
development puts a burden on public coffers. Hence, a negative algebraic sign imputes a net wealth over the 
long-term of the country’s fiscal policy. Accordingly, in our other reported indicators we hold this terminology 
equivalent. 
  1459% of GDP in 2009 results in a gross debt of 909% of GDP. One has to subtract from this 
amount the assets of the GPF worth 95% of GDP in 2009 and the present value of 
petroleum related future revenues which amount to 121%. 
Table 3: Overview of components of the fiscal gap and other sustainability indicators 2009 
(Population Scenario Medium Variant, g=1.5%, r=3.0%) 





















Implicit Debt  850 
Explicit Debt in 2009  59 
Petroleum Wealth  -121 
Fund Assets in 2009  -95 
Fiscal Gap  694 
     
  Future Generations’ Burden (in 






Revenue Gap  17.0 
Transfer Gap  14.4 
Source: Own calculations 
Our second indicator is the future generations’ burden. To calculate this indicator, 
the intertemporal public liabilities and the number of people in future generations are set in 
proportion to each other (equation 9). This indicator implies that the entire adjustment is 
borne by future generations. The burden for future generations can be illustrated as an 
absolute difference between the generational account of the base-year and the 
generational account of the one year after base-year born agent. The future born 
generation in Norway would have to pay about 1,500,000 NOK per person more in taxes 
over their entire life-cycle than they would receive in transfers. On the other hand, the 
base-year born agent gets a net-transfer over his/her remaining life cycle of about 
1,300,000 NOK. Therefore, the future born agent has to carry a high burden compared to 
the corresponding living generation. This is also reflected in our last two sustainability 
indicators, the revenue and transfer gap. Norway’s government would have to raise all 
taxes (except those on petroleum activities) by 17.0% or could decrease all transfers by 
14.4%. 
4.3 Sensitivity  analysis 
We now turn to robustness checks where we relax assumptions regarding choice of base 
year, discounting, economic and population growth, and the constant fiscal policy 
  15assumption. While unusual in generational accounting exercises, the latter sensitivity 
analysis is natural since the Norwegian parliament has already passed legislation on a 
pension reform taking effect in 2011. We return to this issue in Chapter 5. 
4.3.1  The fiscal gap over time 
Figure 6 shows that the Norwegian fiscal gap moves with the business cycle over time. 
Figure 6: Fiscal Gaps 2003 – 2009 
 
Source: Own calculations 
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It is natural that the burden on future generations will be lower if all future years are boom 
years like 2007, and that it is higher if all future years are financial crisis years, like 2009. 
Sensitivity analyses comparing the more normal year 2005 with 2009 are illustrated in 
Table A-3 and Figure A-1 in the appendix. From Table A.3 we see that the future 
generations’ burden, as defined in equation (9), remains substantial but decreases from 
2.8 mill. NOK in 2009, to 1.1 mill. NOK in 2005. 
4.3.2  Growth, discounting, and demography 
To analyze the sensitivity of our results relating to our exogenous parameters interest and 
growth rate,   and  r g , and to our different population projections we calculate 15 different 
cases. Except our standard scenario, we test four more different settings around this 
combination:  g =1.5 and  =4.0%,  r g =2.0 and  =4%,  r g =2.0 and.  =3.0% and  r g =1.0 and 
=3.0%. Furthermore, we distinguish between three possible population scenarios  r
  16medium, high and low variant, as discussed above. Table 4 shows the sustainability gap 
for all possible population scenarios combined with the described growth and interest rate 
settings. 
Table 4: Sensitivity Analysis of the Fiscal Gap 
(in % of GDP of 2009) 
  Medium Variant  High Variant  Low Variant 
g=1.5% 
r=4.0%  250.1 375.9 146.8 
g=2.0% 
r=4.0%  423.9  648.3  251.1 
g=1.5% 
r=3.0%  693.8 1126.5 389.0 
g=2.0% 
r=3.0%  1381.7  2465.3  703.3 
g=1.0% 
r=3.0%  387.1 599.4 223.8 
Source: Own calculations 
The basic interpretation of the results in Table 4 is straightforward. Increasing 
interest rates discounts future public liabilities more heavily, giving them lower weight, and 
thus reducing the present value of future generations’ burden, and the fiscal gap.  
Increasing economic growth will increase both taxes and transfers. However, the 
generational account of a newborn is negative, indicating that transfers have a larger 
share of the expanding economy than taxes. Expanding the economic base through 
economic growth will therefore exacerbate the fiscal gap in the absence of policy changes 
to increase taxes relative to transfers.  
The demographic profiles depend on migration, longevity, and fertility. Detailed 
impacts of migration lies outside the scope of the present analysis. Increased longevity 
clearly increases the fiscal gap through the need for higher transfers. Sometimes it is 
argued as if intergenerational economic imbalances can be alleviated through higher 
fertility rates. Again it turns out that when newborns have negative generational accounts, 
burdens on future generations increase with higher fertility. This effect is counteracted for 
a country with high explicit debt, since the explicit debt can be shared on a larger 
population. The Norwegian situation is different. The petroleum-wealth of the country 
implies that the smaller the future population is, the higher is the petroleum-wealth per 
person, and therefore the lower is the future burden per person. 
  174.3.2  Growth, discounting, and demography 
A complete sensitivity analysis concerning our incidence assumptions (via the micro-
profiles) is not possible even given the good Norwegian data available. 
Figure 7: Generational Accounts with different scenarios concerning family benefits 
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However, to further check the robustness of male vs. female generational accounts, we 
have built two new scenarios in Figure 7. Scenario “Mixed Family Benefits” distributes the 
family benefits in equal shares over men and women. This probably overestimates the 
male share since most single parents are single mothers. A final, more extreme, scenario 
“Standard Reversed” reverses the standard assumption. Here we use the female profiles 
for the males and vice versa. The generic result that men are the main contributors to the 
welfare state holds in every scenario. 
5.  The Norwegian Pension Reform 
The Norwegian pension reform is to take effect from 2011. It seeks to dampen the 
expenditure effect due to growth in life expectancy, and to strengthen ties between former 
earnings, retirement decisions, and pension benefits, thus providing work incentives in 
particular for elderly workers. The reform comprises two major elements.
7 First, one tries 
to control for the growth in expenditures by applying the following set of indexing rules: 
                                                 
7 For a comprehensive overview of all reform details see Risku and Vidlund (2008) and Ministry of Labour 
and Social Inclusion (2009). 
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until retirement. The pension benefits, however, will be adjusted by wage growth minus 
0.75 percentage points only. Pensions will thus not be increased completely in step with 
national wage increase rates. In other words, the purchasing power of a standard pension 
will be lower over time. 
Indexing Rule 2: Pension payments will be adjusted with the life expectancy of the 
population at large. If life expectancy increases, a quasi-actuarial mechanism kicks in and 
reduces annual benefits as the expected length of the retirement period increases.
8 The 
indexation of pension benefits to changes in national life expectancy cuts pension 
generosity.
9  
The next element is to stimulate labor supply. This will be done by lowering the 
implicit tax by making the supplementary (income based) pension more actuarially fair with 
benefits calibrated to the entire working life. Furthermore, the new flexible retirement age 
(starting from 62 years) will be based on an actuarial adjustment of the yearly benefit. As it 
is not clear how individuals will behave to this new policy instruments,
10 we will follow the 
standard procedure of generational accounting and abstract from these reform elements in 
our calculations of fiscal sustainability. 
Figure 8 shows the sustainability and redistribution effects resulting from Indexing 
Rule 1 and 2. Our simulations are made using the average gains in life expectancy with 
reference to the 56-year-old cohort in 2010. The reason for this choice is that the Reform 




                                                 
8 The mechanism implemented is only quasi-actuarially fair, as the indexing of benefits does not include an 
actuarial consideration of life expectancy but only a consideration of average gains in life expectancy. 
9 If the average life expectancy rate increases, employees will have to stay longer in employment to be 
entitled to the same present value of total pension, or accept lower annual pension payments and thus a 
lower present value of total pension benefits. An increase in the expected number of retirement years 
reduces the annual benefit such that the present value of total pension benefits is nearly invariant to changes 
in current remaining life expectancy and retirement age. 
10 See Holmøy and Stensnes (2008) for a further discussion. 
11 Concerning the reference point, i.e. the 56-year-olds in 2010 for indexing pension payments with average 
gains in life expectancy, we want to remark that in the original pension reform plan the group of 67-year-olds 
was earmarked as reference. The effects of taking a younger reference group are smaller cuts in pension 
generosity but as a direct consequence also less sustainability. The reason for lesser cuts in generosity due 
to an indexing with average gains in life expectancy is straightforward as the gains in years of life are bigger 
when comparing the cohort passing into retirement with the group of 67-year-olds compared to the 56-year-
olds. 
12 In the following analysis, the pension reform elements employed are in some respect idealized as the 
actual reform plan envisages a less brisk proceeding. The indexing with average gains in life expectancy e.g. 
is only to be installed as of 2018. In order to exemplify the reform-induced intragenerational effects, we 
nevertheless choose to completely implement the reform from 2010 onwards, as this illustrates (today) what 
actually happens on the intragenerational level (tomorrow). The intergenerational dimension is affected by 
  19Figure 8: Fiscal gaps after pension reform 
 
Source: Own calculations 
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We see that the fiscal gap in 2009 is substantially reduced from 694% of GDP to 
527% of GDP after the pension reform. Note that reduced indexing of pensions with 0.75 
percentage point reduces the fiscal gap by 99 percentage points of GDP (694%-595%), 
which is more than the value of the Government Pension Fund. This shows that seemingly 
small technical adjustments can have a great impact. The powerful impact in this case, 
follows from breaking the link between automatic growth in transfers when income and 
taxes grow. Counter-intuitively the change in the calculations of the endowments from the 
best 20 years to all years increases the fiscal gap. However, this is due to the setup of this 
reform measure which protects most participants from losses via a beneficiary change of 
the pension formula. Holmøy and Stensnes (2008) confirm these findings. The biggest 
impact has the indexing of benefits to the rising average life expectancy with savings worth 
over one GDP of 2009. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
this procedure in a way that all results shown are too optimistic (or rather overestimated) concerning the 
sustainability impact of the reform. 
  20Figure 9: Induced Burden of the pension reform per cohort in annuities 
 





















As we have shown in the last paragraphs, the Norwegian pension reform reduces 
the burden for future generations significantly. However, this implies that living generations 
have to take some of the burden i.e. lower pension benefits. Figure 9 shows the level of 
this redistribution in annuities per cohorts. Interestingly, the picture is not clear cut. 
Laymen’s intuition would probably state that the pensioners are hit the hardest by a 
pension reform but they are not. In fact pensioners over 80 years are the ones hit the 
least. Another surprisingly result is that next to the younger cohorts between 15 and 35 
years the cohorts around 65 years face a relatively high burden. This can be explained by 
the different reform measures. The first new index rule is hitting the generations just before 
entering the benefit phase particularly because they face the longest benefit period while 
their entitlements do not increase much more. Secondly the generous change from the 20 
best to all years in the benefit formula is not reducing the burden for those who are just 
entering the benefit phase. Thirdly the postponement of the second index rule is especially 
favorable for the cohorts around 55 years while the 65 years olds are not benefiting that 
much. However the largest burden is still borne by the even younger cohorts. 
6.  Summary and Conclusion 
Norway is expected to face relatively strong pressure on its public finances due to an 
ageing population and the resulting increase in age-related public expenditure. A 
continuation of the current policy (as of 2009) will end in a long run gap between 
  21government incomes and expenses. To close the gap, a 17% increase in taxes would be 
needed. However, this estimate is sensitive to the underlying assumptions taken. In 
particular, the estimate is changing for the choice of the base year. For example, if 2005 is 
chosen instead of 2009, the computed gap would be an 8 percentage point increase in 
taxes. With the pension reform enacted in 2011, Norway takes a step towards long-term 
fiscal sustainability. Due to life expectancy adjustment in benefits the pension scheme 
expenditure will in practice remain unaffected by the increased longevity. This is 
undoubtedly an effective way to retain fiscal sustainability. According to our results, the 
needed 17% increase in taxes (2009) is decreased to 12%. If 2005 is chosen as base year 
the needed 8% increase is diminished to 5%.  
We have also looked at the intragenerational distribution. Here we find that men as 
a group bear the fiscal burden. They receive most pensions, but as a group they pay 
relatively more in the form of taxes. This conclusion holds even if men are attributed 
benefits connected to children. However, all our calculations are sensitive to assumptions 
regarding population projections. In our calculations we assume a fertility rate of 1.9. 
Increasing this birth rate worsen the fiscal balance. The same holds for increasing the 
assumed GDP-growth rate. 
We started by asking whether Norway is overconsuming its petroleum wealth. This 
is a reasonable question to ask also in the light of the broad political consensus of trying to 
perpetuate the Government Pension Fund (GPF) to make the transitory petroleum income 
available also to future generations. In all our sensitivity analyses, there are no scenario 
where the GPF is not depleted. On the other hand, the recent pension reform shows that 
substantial improvements in the long term fiscal balance are possible. During some 
decades Norway has experienced a lucky streak with improving terms of trade in the new 
world economy, typically influenced by Chinese demand for inputs and strong competition 
in manufactured goods. Being an exporter of natural resources like oil, gas and fish, and a 
beneficiary of lower prices on manufactured goods, Norway has enjoyed a very favorable 
position. Our analyses suggest that Norway may be close to intergenerational fiscal 
balance provided that the luckiest of circumstances continue in the decades to come. Even 
under such favorable conditions, both the petroleum wealth and pension reform are 
necessary to secure sustainability. However, it is reasonable to believe that the lucky 
streak will come to an end also in the case of Norway. In that case it is necessary to keep 
on a continuous reform process to promote efficient markets, and to align expenditures 
and revenues to short- and long term constraints. 
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Table A1: Sensitivity Analysis of the Sustainability Indicators 
Spread  Indicators  Population Projection 
   Medium  High  Low 
g=1.5% 
r=4.0% 
Fiscal gap  
(in % of GDP 2009)  250.1 375.9 146.8 
Petroleum Revenues 
(in % of GDP 2009)  -107.8 -107.8 -107.8 
Future Generations’ Burden
(in Thousand NOK)  1793.2 1976.7 1567.2 
Revenue Gap  
(in %)  10.7 13.7  7.5 
Transfer Gap  
(in %)  9.5 11.9 6.9 
g=2.0% 
r=4.0% 
Fiscal gap  
(in % of GDP 2009)  423.9  648.3  251.1 
Petroleum Revenues 
(in % of GDP 2009)  -113.5  -113.5  -113.5 
Future Generations’ Burden
(in Thousand NOK)  2365.5  2539.6  2199.0 
Revenue Gap  
(in %)  14.2  17.7  10.6 
Transfer Gap  
(in %)  12.3  14.9  9.5 
g=1.5% 
r=3.0% 
Fiscal gap  
(in % of GDP 2009)  693.8 1126.5 389.0 
Petroleum Revenues 
(in % of GDP 2009)  -120.8 -120.8 -120.8 
Future Generations’ Burden
(in Thousand NOK)  2831.5 3048.3 2668.8 
Revenue Gap  
(in %)  17.0 20.9 12.9 
Transfer Gap  
(in %)  14.4 17.2 11.3 
g=2.0% 
r=3.0% 
Fiscal gap  
(in % of GDP 2009)  1381.7  2465.3  703.3 
Petroleum Revenues 
(in % of GDP 2009)  -128.1  -128.1  -128.1 
Future Generations’ Burden
(in Thousand NOK)  3587.6  3902.9  3415.1 
Revenue Gap  
(in %)  21.6  26.2  16.9 
Transfer Gap  
(in %)  17.7  20.7  14.3 
g=1.0% 
r=3.0% 
Fiscal gap  
(in % of GDP 2009)  387.1 599.4 223.8 
Petroleum Revenues 
(in % of GDP 2009)  -114.4 -114.4 -114.4 
Future Generations’ Burden
(in Thousand NOK)  2181.1 2376.8 1973.0 
Revenue Gap  
(in %)  13.0 16.4  9.4 
Transfer Gap  
(in %)  11.4 14.0  8.5 
Source: Own calculations
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0 1 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0 1 0 0
Family Benefits 
Men Women
0 1 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0 1 0 0
Unemployment Benefits 
Men Women
0 1 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0 1 0 0
Social Housing 
Men Women
0 1 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0 1 0 0
Social Welfare 
Men Women
Source: See Section 3 
Table A3: Indicators in Comparison – 2005 vs. 2009 
Spread  Indicators  Year (Population Projection Medium) 
   2005  2009 
g=1.5% 
r=3.0% 
Fiscal gap  
(in % of GDP 2009)  325.7 693.8 
Petroleum Revenues 
(in % of GDP 2009)  -222.6 -120.8 
Future Generations’ Burden
(in Thousand NOK)  1136.3 2831.5 
Revenue Gap  
(in %)  7.9 17.0 
Transfer Gap  
(in %)  7.3 14.4 
Source: Own calculations 
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